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Combustible dusts are finely divided particles that present an explosion hazard when suspended 
in air. Dust explosion may become more severe in a confined space, especially due to the 
occurrence of second dust explosion. Combustible dust explosions have caused numerous 
fatalities and catastrophic property damages in industries. They are now a recognized hazard that 
plant owners, managers, and workers cannot ignore. Many industry-specific NFPA dust 
standards (e.g., NFPA 61, 484, 655, 664) on combustible dust contain provisions for conducting 
DHAs. NFPA 654 applies to general combustible dusts for preventing combustible dust flash 
fires and explosion, which requires designing the fire and explosion safety provisions based on 
the dust PHA. The newest standard of NFPA 652 (Standard on the Fundamentals of Combustible 
Dust) became effective on September 7, 2015. It requires that dust hazards analysis (DHA) be 
completed on existing facilities and significant modifications before September 7, 2018. 
Assessment of what can go wrong, however, may not be an easy task for dust-handling plants. 
NFPA performance-based dust hazard assessment and OSHA regulatory compliance 
requirements lack detailed guidance on how to conduct DHA. Meanwhile, standard or code-
based prescriptive DHA may create redundantly unnecessary overprotection for hazard-involved 
dust processes and equipment. In this research, a risk-based approach is developed by 
incorporating both likelihood analysis and consequence analysis to define safeguard 
requirements for any of potential process deviations, operating upsets, human errors, and 
equipment failures. By comparing safeguard requirements with the credit provided through 
safeguard availability analysis, a risk-based DHA will provide a sufficient understanding of dust 





A great many finely divided solid matters represent a serious industrial problem. A dust hazard, 
especially a dust explosion, is a great threat to industries handling combustible dusts. The U.S. 
Chemical Safety Board reported 281 major dust explosion incidents, which killed 119 workers 
and injured 718 more, from 1989 to 2005 [1]. Primarily the dust explosions are common in coal 
mining, flour milling, and grain storage [2]. Frank gives incident data reported by US CSB and 
FM Global, which illustrate that dust explosions have mainly occurred in the following industries 
[3]: 
 Wood and paper products (e.g., dust from sawing, cutting, and grinding, etc.); 
 Grain and foodstuffs (e.g., grain dust, flour); 
 Metal and metal products (e.g., metal powders and dusts); 
 Power generation (e.g., pulverized coal, peat and wood); 
 Chemical process industry (e.g., acetate flake, pharmaceuticals, dyes, pesticides); 
 Plastic/polymer production and processing; 
 Mining (e.g., coal, sulfide ores, sulfur); and  
 Textile manufacturing (e.g., linen flax, cotton, wool). 
 
2. Dust Hazards 
Any oxidizable material with sufficiently small particle sizes, under the right circumstances, is 
potentially capable of combustion. Combustible dust presents three types of combustible hazards: 
dust explosion, flash fire, and smoldering fires. A dust explosion is the most severe of these 
hazards. 
A dust explosion requires five necessary conditions: fuel, oxidizer, suspension, ignition source, 
and containment, which is normally symbolized as a dust explosion pentagon. When dust 
disperses in air within a non-congested area or an open space, a rapidly burning flash fire can 
result at a certain range of dust concentration. Dust flash fires can cause fatal injuries. Dusts that 
settle on a hot surface (e.g., motors or steam piping) may develop smoldering and potentially 
auto-ignite due to exothermic oxidation. Dust smoldering fires can also occur in bulk solids in 
the absence of hot surfaces. If a dust layer is thick enough to prevent heat from escaping, the heat 
from oxidation can cause smoldering to continue. Smoldering fires themselves may not be 
immediately hazardous to people, but they can act as ignition sources for flash fires and 
explosions, as well as a source of toxic gases (e.g., CO) emission.   
A Dust explosion domino can occur due to the secondary or tertiary dust explosions triggered by 
the initial one. That is usually the main contributor to the severe losses in the solid-processing 
industries. When the overpressure produced from the initial explosion reaches a dust layer, a 
potentially large amount of dust could be dispersed and ignited by the initial dust flames, 
resulting in far more destructive overpressure. Moreover, secondary or tertiary dust explosions 
are often observed far from the location where the primary one occurs, which induces difficulties 
in safety measure application.  
Dust explosion DDT (deflagration-to-detonation) is a particularly hazardous event. It may cause 
an overpressure that is much greater than the strength of most industrial buildings. In a dust 
explosion accident, a detonation is unlikely to occur spontaneously. It usually requires a DDT 
event. A DDT develops typically due to a dust flame propagation into a confined space 
combining with secondary/tertiary dust explosions.  
 
3. Regulations and Standards for Dust Hazards Controlling  
As a primary regulatory organization in charge of process safety, U.S. Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA) began its combustible dust National Emphasis Program (NEP) in 
October 2007 to help lower the risk of workers being exposed to explosive dust hazards. In 
March 2008, OSHA issued the OSHA Fact Sheet of “Hazard Alert: Combustible Dust 
Explosions” to address the importance of dust hazard awareness. “In many combustible dust 
incidents, employers and employees were unaware that a hazard even existed. It is important to 
determine if a company has this hazard and, if it does, an action must be taken now to prevent 
tragic consequences [4]”. From this Fact Sheet, OSHA also requires a thorough dust hazard 
analysis for all dust handled, all operations conducted (including by-products), all spaces 
(including hidden ones), and all potential ignition sources. In 2009, OSHA published Hazard 
Communication Guidance for Combustible Dust (OSHA 3371-08). This guidance is not a 
regulation, but an advisory document to help manufacturers and importers of chemicals 
recognize the potential for dust explosion and to identify appropriate protective measures as part 
of their hazard determination under the Hazard Communication Standard (HCS). As mandatory 
requirements, the following Federal OSHA standards address certain aspect of combustible dust 
hazards [5]:  
 29 CFR 1910.22 Housekeeping 
 OSH Act: Section 5(a)(1) General Duty Clause 
 29 CFR 1910.94 Ventilation 
 29 CFR 1910.272 Grain Handling Facilities 
 29 CFR 1910.176 Housekeeping in Storage Areas 
 29 CFR 1910.269 Housekeeping at Coal-handling Operations 
 29 CFR 1910.1200 Hazard Communications 
 29 CFR 1910.178 Powered Industrial Trucks 
 29 CFR 1910.307 Hazardous (Classified) Locations 
 29 CFR 1910.132 Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) 
 29 CFR 1910.119 Process Safety Management 
 29 CFR 1910.252 Welding, Cutting, and Brazing Operations 
In addition to OSHA standards, there are several industry consensus standards that address 
combustible dust issues. The primary National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) consensus 
standards and documents related to dust hazards include: 
 NFPA 61, Standard for the Prevention of Fire and Dust Explosions in Agricultural and 
Food Processing Facility. 
 NFPA 484, Standard for Combustible Metals. 
 NFPA 655, Standard for the Prevention of Sulfur Fires and Explosions.  
 NFPA 664, Standard for the Prevention of Fires and Explosions in Wood Processing and 
Wood-working Facility. 
 NFPA 68, Standard on Explosion Prevention by Deflagration Venting. 
 NFPA 69, Standard on Explosion Prevention Systems.  
 NFPA 499, Recommended Practice for the Classification of Combustible Dusts and 
Hazardous (Classified) Locations for Electrical Installations in Chemical Process Areas. 
 NFPA 77, Recommended Practice on Static Electricity.   
 NFPA 654, Standard for the Prevention of Fire and Dust Explosions from the 
Manufacturing, Processing, and Handling of Combustible Particulate Solids. 
 NFPA 652, Standard on the Fundamentals of Combustible Dust. 
 NFPA Fire Protection Handbook. 
NFPA 652 was released in September 2015. It requires a dust hazard analysis (DHA) for those 
facilities and operations that manufacture, process, blend, convey, repackage, generate, or handle 
combustible dusts or particulate solids. A DHA for the existing facilities can be retroactive. The 
time limit to finish the DHA is three years from the date the standard became effective.  
In addition to NFPA standards, OSHA has also referenced FM7-76, Prevention and Mitigation of 
Combustible Dust Explosions and Fires for dust hazard controlling. Some state and local fire 
codes may apply. There are two predominant model fire codes (International Code Council’s 
International Fire Code, and NFPA’s Uniform Fire Code) adopted by many jurisdictions.  
 
4. A Risk-Based DHA 
Based on CCPS’s definition, a risk is a measure of human injuries, environmental damages, or 
economic losses in term of both the incident likelihood and the magnitude of the loss or injury. A 
risk-based DHA is a risk-analyzed approach for dust hazards identification and evaluation, which 
inherently includes the consequence prediction from a dust fire/explosion/toxic hazard and its 
likelihood estimation. A risk-based DHA can provide organizations with a method to implement 
risk tolerance criteria. It also provides a logical method of demonstrating that a performance-
based protection option meets the intent of a regulatory or standards-based option. A risk-based 
approach may also be useful if standards don’t have a prescriptive requirement for a particular 
piece of equipment [6].  
In this paper, a systematic procedure is developed for a risk-based DHA study, which is 









4.1 Dust Sampling 
To identify dust hazards, a dust sampling plan should be developed and documented to provide 
data as needed to comply with the requirements from NFPA 652. Dust sampling may be optional 
under certain conditions, e.g., (1) Existing dust sampling/testing data are good representatives of 
the materials in dust process equipment or collected on surfaces at their near locations; or (2) 
Dust sampling/testing data are available from facility historical records or literature resources, 
which can be verified to be good representations of currently processing materials and operating 
conditions; or (3) Processing dust material is unlikely to be combustible or explosible. Material 
Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) are not reliable sources for a dust hazard identification. The U.S. 
Chemical Safety Board (CSB) reviewed the MSDS of 140 known substances that produce 
combustible dusts and found that 41% of the MSDS did not warn users about potential explosion 
hazards [1].  
A successful dust sampling plan should include the following [7]: 
 Identification of all the locations where dusts are present 
 Identification and collection of representative samples 
 Preservation of dust sample integrity 
 Communication with the test laboratory regarding dust handling 
 Documentation of samples taken   
 
4.2 Dust Sample Testing 
A number of dust physical properties (e.g., dust particulate size, moisture content, volume 
electrical resistance, etc.) and explosion parameters (e.g., Kst, Pmax, MEC, MIE, MAIT, LOC, etc.) 
are commonly needed for a dust hazard analysis, particularly for a dust ignition probability 
analysis and a fire/explosion consequence prediction.  
In general, dust sample testing shall be run on the materials as sampled. Many test procedures 
call for the sample to be dried to less than 5% moisture and screened, and the test run on material 
less than 200 mesh (75 microns) in size. This is done to represent a worst case for determining a 
material combustibility or explosivity property, but sometimes can be overly conservative.  
To determine whether a dust has an explosion hazard or not, a “Go/No-Go” explosibility 
screening test is normally used by following ASTM E1226 standard. The pressure rise in the 
testing chamber is measured. If the ratio of the final pressure from the deflagration to the initial 
pressure is higher than 2, the dust is considered to be explosible. When the dispersed dust 
concentration in air falls within its flammability range, dust ignitibility is mainly dependent on 
the minimum ignition energy (MIE) if an ignition source exists, or the minimum autoignition 
temperature (MAIT) when no credible ignition sources are available. Dust MIE data can be 
collected by following the ASTM E2019 standard. ASTM E1491 provides the detailed guidance 
on MAIT testing. For dust layer fire due to a hot surface, a standard test by following ASTM 
E2021 can be applied. The parameters of dust minimum explosible concentration (MEC) and 
limiting oxygen concentration (LOC) are mostly referred for dust cloud inerting or dust flash 
fire/explosion prevention. The related standards ASTM E1515 and ASTM E2931 are designated 
for dust MEC and LOC testing, respectively.    
     
4.3  Conduct a Risk-based DHA 
Whenever a facility is determined to have combustible or explosible dust materials, the facility 
owner/employer shall be responsible to ensure a DHA is completed in accordance with the 
requirements of NFPA 652, as well as to comply with other applicable regulations and standards. 
A DHA is designed to identify and evaluate dust-involved hazards to personnel, property, or the 
environment. Dust hazards may include flash fire, layer fire, explosion, or toxicity. A risk-based 
DHA analyzes a dust hazard’s consequence, and the corresponding likelihood. A risk value will 
be assigned to each of the specific hazardous events, and then compared with organization’s risk 
criteria to recommend prevention or mitigation measures if necessary. Similar to a typical 
HAZOP process hazard analysis, a risk-based DHA is a qualitative approach, which includes a 
systematic logic flow as follows: 
 
4.3.1 Identify Initial Events  
To be consistent with the requirements from NFPA 652, a dust hazard analysis should consider 
the combustible hazardous dusts present within the equipment, or dust accumulation on surfaces 
within buildings or building compartments. Dusts outside of buildings are not within the DHA 
scope unless frequent personnel exposures happen. If a large amount of toxic dusts or their by-
products release to atmosphere, both onsite and off-site safety and/or environmental concerns are 
included in the risk-based DHA. 
Based on insurance organization’s data, FM-Global provides a list of common process 
equipment involved in dust fires and explosions [8]: air-material separators (e.g., cyclones, 
baghouse filters, cartridge filters); solid size reduction equipment (e.g., grinders, mills); dryers 
(e.g., spray dryers, flash dryers, fluid bed dryers, agitation dryers); dust storage vessels (e.g., 
silos, hoppers); conveyors (e.g., screw conveyers, belt conveyers, bucket conveyers, pneumatic 
conveyers); portable containers (e.g., RIBCs, FIBCs, fiber drums); blenders/mixers; and others. 
Dusts in equipment can always be treated as in a confined space. For most of dust-involved 
processes, air is present in the equipment therefore, dust explosion contingencies are primarily 
based on the potential ignition source’s identification.  
In the absence of good housekeeping practices, the accumulation of dust on different surfaces 
can occur slowly through nearly invisible fugitive dust leaks. In addition to floors under and 
around processing equipment, dust accumulation can occur on any horizontal or slightly inclined 
surface, including beams and supports, ledges, conduit and pipe racks, cable trays, ducts, above 
suspended ceilings, etc. Such surfaces can easily have enough dust to create a dust fire, or a 
worse dust explosion hazard, especially the secondary or tertiary dust explosions in congested 
areas. A risk-based DHA is required for a building with poor dust housekeeping. Same to the 
dust hazard contingencies analysis within equipment, potential ignition sources introduction or 
generation within the buildings will be analyzed systematically.  
Process deviations within a pre-noded operation are the basis for dust hazards initial events 
identification. Compared with a typical HAZOP study, some generally applied parameters, e.g., 
temperature, pressure, flow, and level, may work but could not well represent an abnormal 
operation. For example, a high or low temperature is not normally a credible scenario as most 
dust processes are at ambient conditions; a high or low dust flowrate is not the dependence for 
dust explosion severity but a potential for the secondary or tertiary explosion. In a risk-based 
DHA, any potential ignition sources introduction or generation is applied as a process deviation 
to identify a dust hazard initial event. Potential ignition sources may be an open flame, a hot 
surface, a mechanic/electrical spark, overheating from mechanical friction or abnormal heat 
input, an electrostatic discharge, or others. Here are some typical examples for a dust-involved 
process deviation: 
 Overheating from mechanical friction, e.g., lubrication loss to a bearing, conveyer belt 
mis-alignment 
 Overheating from an abnormal heat input, e.g., a control valve leading to more hot air 
inflow into a dryer  
 Smoldering from a dust layer decomposition or reaction 
 Loss of cooling 
 Hot surfaces, e.g., furnaces, electrical motor, or exchangers 
 Open flames 
 Hot work, e.g., cutting, welding, and grinding 
 Mechanic spark from, e.g., tramp metal, loss of hammer, or friction 
 Ignition sources from an upstream feed 
 Electrical spark/arc generated from electrical equipment 
 Electrostatic discharge 
 External events, e.g., Incident fires 
 Industrial truck 
 Others 
 
4.3.2 Predict Dust Hazard Severity 
An uncontrolled initial event may propagate into any of the ultimate consequences, e.g., onsite or 
off-site injuries or fatalities, property losses, and/or environment damages. As an example, Table 
1 describes the dust hazard consequence categories.  
Table 1 Risk-based DHA Consequence Categories 
Category Description Onsite/Off-site People Business/Asset Environment 
A Catastrophic 
Public: Serious injury or 
fatality 
Onsite: Several fatalities (≥ 
2) 








Public: Medical treatment 
Onsite: 1 fatality, or 
permanent disabilities 
1 M – 10 M 




Public: No impact 
Onsite: no fatality, 
irreversible disabilities 
100 K – 1 M 





Public: No impact 
Onsite: Minor reversible 
injuries 
10 K – 100 K 
dollars of loss 
On-site clean-up 
 
In this risk-based DHA, prediction of dust hazard severity is a qualitative estimation in term of 
the combination effect from different factors, for example, dust combustibility or explosibility 
(e.g., Kst, Pmax, (dP/dt)max), dust toxicity (e.g., exposure limits on 8-hours TWA), dust physical 
properties (e.g., particulate size and moisture content), occupancy nearby, dust dispersion space 
and confinement, hybrid mixture, secondary dust explosion tendency, and so on. For a dust 
explosion, its severity will become worse if the dusts are: 
 More finely divided 
 Higher Kst, or more reactive 
 More irregularly shaped  
 With less moisture content, or drier  
 Less agglomerated 
 Slightly higher than the stoichiometric concentrations 
 Larger amount of dust dispersion  
 More turbulent conditions 
 With a more confined degree 
 Combustible gas/vapor contained (a hybrid system)  
 
4.3.3 Estimate likelihood 
Normally, the likelihood of a dust-involved failure scenario could not simply be taken as the 
frequency of initiating event. The probability of the series of other unplanned events needs to 
occur to lead to an undesirable consequence. For example, the presence of credible ignition 
sources, or the presence of suspended dust within the explosible range. The probability of 
occupancy is commonly used as a frequency modifier based on the data of time-at-risk. Eq. (1) 
below gives the formula to calculate the overall likelihood of a dust explosion failure scenario 
before safeguards are applied. 
                                                𝑃𝑡 = 𝑃𝑒 × 𝑃𝑖 × 𝑃𝑠 × 𝑃𝑟                                                          Eq. (1) 
Where,  
Pt is the overall likelihood of a dust-involved failure scenario before safeguards are applied in the 
unit of times per one year.  
Pe is the frequency of an initial event in the unit of times per one year. A reliable data source 
should be sought after from the facility historical incidents or near-miss data records, or other 
facilities with the similar process operations. Industrial generic databases, e.g., CCPS books, UK 
HSE, or US OGP can be referred for an initial event frequency estimation if the facility’s 
specific failure data is not available. Table 2 lists some generic initial events failure frequency 
data based on a CCPS book [9].  
Pi is the probability of a dust ignition, which is dependent on the presence of credible ignition 
sources. It is unitless. The value of probability is between 0 and 1, where 0 means very unlikely, 
and 1 is very likely. Probability of a dust ignition is closely related to dust material 
characteristics (e.g., MIE, MAIT, particle size, moisture content, etc.) when combustible dusts 
suspend in air within flammability limit range. Dahn, Reyes, and Kusmierz gave some ignition 
ease criteria for dust fire and explosion engineering hazards analysis (in Table 3 below) based on 
different stimuli and the levels of stimuli [10]. Some common ignition sources and ignition 
probabilities are discussed below: 
 Open flames: The probability of a dust ignition can be 1 since an open flame is generally 
capable of igniting any combustible dust.  
 Overheating from mechanic friction: Friction from hot bearings or jammed belts 
represents a very high portion of ignition sources [8]. A very high temperature may 
generate from mechanic friction due to a loss of lubrication or misalignment. The 
probability of dust ignition can be conservatively taken to be 1 for a bearing friction [11].  
 Hot work (e.g., cutting, grinding, welding): Hot work can release very high energy 
intensity heat or spark, which may have 100% of potential chance to ignite combustible 
dusts [11].  
 Overheating from abnormal heat input or loss of cooling: Combustible dust MAIT is a 
main factor to be referred to for this type of ignition probability estimation. Attention 
should be paid to dust moisture loss during the abnormal heat input or loss of cooling 
phase, since a drier dust may have a much lower MAIT than the sampled one, and the 
ignition probability can increase dramatically. 
 Mechanical impact/friction sparks: Combustible dust ignition probability from mechanical 
sparks depends on both its MIE and MAIT. The International Social Security Agency 
(ISSA) provides some guidance on dust cloud ignitability prediction using spark 
equivalent electrical energy and ignition temperature. Figure 2 gives an example based on 
steel grinding spark and steel friction spark [12], where the intersection of the MIE and 
MAIT can be located to identify whether dust is ignitable from a mechanical 
grinding/friction spark.  
 Electrical Sparks or arcs: Electrical equipment can produce sparks or arcs that may ignite 
a dust cloud. Combustible dusts ignition by electrical arcs has very high probability (can 
be 1 for a conservative purpose). Electrical sparks to ignite a dust cloud can be similar to 
mechanical sparks depending on dust MIE and MAIT.    
 Electrostatic discharges: Static electricity is often generated by the flow of solids during 
handling, transfer and processing. The susceptibility of combustible dust to ignition by 
electrostatic discharge is a function of the MIE of the dust. Table 4 includes the data of 
ignition probability based on MIE range for a dust ignitability analysis [11].  
 Smoldering: Smoldering is a flameless combustion. If a smoldering dust pile is disturbed, 
it can lead to a dust deflagration in the form of flash fire or explosion. The likelihood of 
ignition for smoldering nests depends on the material being handled. An organization 
needs to determine this from historical information or appropriate testing.  
Ps is the probability of the presence of a suspended dust within the explosible range. It is unitless. 
Most explosible dusts have the explosible range of 50-100 g/m3 on the lean side, and 2-3 kg/m3 
on the rich one [13]. Per NFPA 654, a dust layer larger than 1/32 inch accumulated on surface 
areas of at least 5% of a room’s floor or above ceiling presents a significant explosion hazard 
[14]. The probability of dust suspension in air to form a combustible dust-air mixture is highly 
dependent on the total dust amount, air stability, and dust movement conditions. For conservative 
purpose, this probability is normally taken to be 1 unless there is a firm basis for other values. 
Po is the probability of time at risk, which can be determined based on the fraction of time the 
“at-risk” condition exists. In general, it can be calculated using equation as Eq. (2).  
                             𝑃𝑟 =
𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 𝑎𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 (1 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟)⁄                                  Eq. (2) 
By combining the initial event frequency with all other applicable probabilities from frequency 
modifiers and/or other unplanned events, the likelihood of a dust-involved failure scenario can be 
estimated and categorized as described in Table 5. Note that the estimated likelihood is before 
safeguards applied. 
 
Table 2 Initial Event Frequencies 
Item Description Frequency 
BPCS Control Loop 
The process parameter controlled by the BPCS 
control loop deviates without the ability to recover on 





The spurious operation of SCAI may lead to an upset 
or other consequence of concern. 





A human error occurs on a task that is performed at a 
frequency of once per week or more often.  The 
consequences are dependent on the task being 




performed 1/week to 
1/month) 
A human error occurs on a task that is performed at a 
frequency between once per week to once per month.  
The consequences are dependent on the task being 






A human error occurs on a task that is performed at a 
frequency of less than once per month.  The 
consequences are dependent on the task being 




This scenario covers a self-contained pressure 
regulator in pressure reducing or backpressure 
service, operating in continuous control mode, which 




The failure of the screw conveyor stops the process 
flow, resulting in an upstream and/or downstream 
upset or other consequence of concern. 




Overheating of the conveyed material, potentially 
resulting in ignition or decomposition of material 
within the conveyor. 
0.1/yr 
Fan or blower failure 
This loss of operation could result in process upset, 
with a number of possible consequences as a result of 
process deviation. 
0.1/yr 
Single Circuit Loss of 
Power 
Complete or partial loss of local power due to a 
component failure in single circuit.  Does not include 
frequency of site-wide power loss. 
0.1/yr 
Hose failure, leak and 
rupture 
Applies to leaks or complete failure due to age, 







Table 3 Ignition ease criteria for dust fire and explosion hazard analysis 
Stimuli Ease of Ignition Levels of Stimuli 
Thermal (Heat) 
Low Temperature < 100 OC 
Medium Temperature 100 OC-300 OC 
High Temperature > 100 OC 
Electrostatic 
Discharge 
Easy < 5 mJ 
Moderate 5-30 mJ 
Difficult 30-200 mJ 
Hard to Ignite > 200 mJ 
Impact 
Low Energy 0.5 kg-m 
Moderate Energy 0.5-5 kg-m 
High Energy > 5kg-m 
Friction 




Hard to Ignite > 15000 psi@7fps 
Chemical 
Decomposition  
Low < 100 cal/gm 
Moderate 100-500 cal/gm 
Higher 500-1500 cal/gm 
Highest > 1500 cal/gm 
 
Table 4 MIE vs. dust ignition probability 
MIE Ignition Probability 
0 – 10 mJ 1 
10 – 100 mJ 0.1 
>100 mJ 0.01 
 







≥ 1 1 Very frequent: occurs at least 
once per year 
0.1 - 1 2 Frequent: likely occurs at least 
once in 10 years 
0.01 – 0.1  3 Infrequent: likely occurs at least 
once in 100 years 
≤ 0.01 4 Improbable: likely occurs less 
than once in 100 years 
 
 
Figure 2 Conditions for ignition of dust by mechanical grinding and friction sparks. 
 
4.3.4 Conduct Risk Ranking 
By applying the organization approved risk matrix, each cause-consequence combination which 
constitutes a hazard scenario can be risk-ranked. As an example, Figure 2 shows the number of 
credible safeguards or independent protection layers (IPLs) required based on the initial event 
consequence and likelihood before safeguards applied, where risks are tolerable for failure 













 1 2 3 4 
A 4 4 3 2 
B 4 3 2 1 
C 3 2 1 NR 
D 2 1 NR NR 
       Figure 2 Risk Matrix for a Risk-based DHA 
4.3.5 Determine Safeguard Credits 
This step is designed to review and document credible safeguards or IPLs for prevention and/or 
mitigation of the consequences. Safeguards are engineered system(s) as defined in the P&IDs 
and other engineering information, and the administrative controls, such as operator response to 
alarms, that can prevent or mitigate the hazard including, but not necessarily limited to, such 
items as: 
 Prevention safeguards 
o Prevent dust presence (e.g., no dust leakage) 
o Prevent dust dispersion (e.g., wet conditions, large particle size) 
o Control dust concentration outside of flammability range (e.g., inerting) 
o Remove ignition sources (e.g., no hot surface/flame, grounding and bonding, electrical 
area classification, control of hot work, lubrication, vibration/temperature monitoring) 
 Mitigation safeguards 
o Explosion containment (e.g., vessel designed to contain explosion, install an explosion 
cover/shield) 
o Explosion suppression (e.g., inject explosion suppressants) 
o Explosion isolation (e.g., shut-off valve, rotary valve, physical barriers) 
o Explosion venting (e.g., overpressure venting and relief systems) 
o Fire and toxic response system (e.g., sprinklers, toxic powder/gas detectors) 
 Administrative Safeguards  
o Housekeeping programs 
o Emergency response/PPE 
o Training programs  
Each safeguard or IPL will be assigned a credit value. These values are obtained by referring to 
various databases and guidance books, such as CCPS and an example is shown in Table 6 [6, 15]. 
The assignment of the credit values should be verified with facility process engineers, operators 
and instrument professionals if extra information is needed.  
4.3.6 Provide Recommendations 
Based on the IPLs required and IPLs available, the gap will be calculated and the 
recommendations will be made if the IPLs required are less than credible safeguards or IPL 
credits. Additional IPLs recommended to be added should reduce the risk by: (1) preventing the 
consequences altogether via design alternatives; (2) lowering the likelihood of the failure 
scenarios; (3) and/or mitigating the consequences.  
The risk-based DHA team should review the engineering design solutions or administrative 
controls to ensure that the proposed recommendations would sufficiently reduce the risk and not 
introduce new hazards or risks. After applying the recommended solutions, a revalidation of the 
failure scenarios should be conducted promptly to determine if the recommended solutions 
reduce the risk to an acceptable level.  
During a risk-based DHA study, the DHA team may recommend some more detailed analysis, 
e.g., semi-quantitative LOPA, or quantitative QRA, for those failure scenarios with high severity 
or/and risk.   
 
Table 6 Common Safeguards and Assigned Credits 
Item Description credit 
Safety Interlock 
Safety interlocks prevent progression of a scenario to the 
consequence of concern following an initiating event. 
1 
SIS Loop 









The explosion isolation valve protects against the 





Proper operation of explosion panels during an internal dust 
explosion can protect a vessel or duct from excessive 
overpressure. 
2 
Vent panels or 
enclosures 
Vent panels prevent damage to an enclosure or room.  
However, activation of the panel does result in a pressure 
wave and loss of containment of dust.  If the vent panel 
relieves into an occupied area, a vent panel may not be an 




Within process equipment: the automated fire suppression 





For local application:  fire suppression systems for local 




For a Room:  fire suppression systems mitigate fire in a 
room or small enclosure. 
1 
Human response to 
an abnormal 
condition 
Human response to an abnormal condition can prevent a 





The explosion suppression system protects against 
explosions that could cause equipment damage, including 
rupture.  More quantitative analysis may support a lower 





PPE prevents consequences associated with exposure of 




Will reduce the frequency of large consequences 
(widespread spill) of a tank overfill/rupture/spill etc. 
2 
Open Vent (no Will prevent overpressure. 2 
valve) 
Fireproofing 




Will reduce the frequency of large consequences of and 





If properly implemented can significantly reduce the 
frequency of consequences associated with a scenario.  
Note: the LOPA rules for some companies allow inherently 
safe design features to eliminate certain scenarios (e.g., 





If properly designed, installed and maintained these should 
eliminate the potential for flashback through a piping 
system or into a vessel or tank. 
2 
Relief Valve 
Prevents system exceeding specified overpressure.  




Prevents system exceeding specified overpressure.  





Can be credited as an IPL if not associated with the 




For any facility with hazardous dusts that present an explosion, flash fire, layer fire, or toxic 
hazard, a dust hazard analysis is mandatorily required per NFPA 652. However, NFPA 652 lacks 
the detailed guidance on dust hazard assessment. Other industry-specified NFPA standards are 
mostly about the prescriptive DHA, which may not have a prescriptive requirement for a 
particular piece of equipment or may create unnecessary overprotection for some hazard-
involved dust processes and equipment.  
In this paper, a risk-based approach is developed by incorporating both likelihood and 
consequence to estimate the risk for any failure scenario. By applying the organization’s risk 
tolerance criteria, a ranked risk value will be given to the analyzed scenario as the safeguard or 
IPL requirements. For any unacceptable consequence, safeguard availability review and IPL 
credit evaluation will be conducted. The gap between the IPL requirements and safeguard IPL 
credits will warn the risk-based DHA study team to provide risk-reduction recommendations. 
Compared to a prescriptive DHA, a risk-based DHA provides a sufficient understanding of dust 
hazards, as well as the appropriate safeguard level of demand for dust process safety work 
activity.  
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